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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SEAN MICHAEL CLARKE,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48152-2020
Minidoka County Case No.
CR34-18-200

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Clarke failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
revoked Clarke’s probation and executed his underlying sentence?
ARGUMENT
Clarke Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
A.

Introduction
The state charged Clarke with possession of hydrocodone, second offense. (R., pp. 37-39.)

Clarke pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (R., pp. 45-57.) The district court sentenced
Clarke to five years with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 58-61.) At the
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conclusion of the retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Clarke on probation for three years.
(R., pp. 65-67.)
A little over three months after the court placed Clarke on probation, the state filed a motion
to revoke probation. (R., pp. 69-88.) The state alleged Clarke violated his probation in several
ways, including by engaging in an unauthorized relationship with another felony probationer,
testing positive for and admitting to using methamphetamine, being discharged from treatment for
non-compliance, absconding from supervision, and failing to make payments towards the cost of
supervision.

(R., pp. 72-73.)

Clarke admitted violating his probation by consuming

methamphetamine and failing to successfully complete substance abuse treatment. (R., p. 99.)
The district court revoked probation, re-imposed the underlying sentence, and imposed a new fouryear period of probation, including as a requirement that Clarke “successfully complete drug
court.” (R., pp. 115-17.)
Less than a month later the court issued a bench warrant when Clarke failed to appear for
drug court. (R., p. 118.) Clarke was terminated from drug court. (R., pp. 120-22.) The state filed
another motion to revoke probation. (R., pp. 132-33.) The probation violation report alleged that
he violated by failing to complete drug court, failing to report to his probation/parole officer,
moving residence without permission, using methamphetamine, and absconding from supervision.
(R., pp. 124-26.) Clarke was arrested a full year after the warrant for his arrest was issued. (R.,
pp. 144-46.) He admitted each alleged violation, except the allegation that he moved residence
without permission which the state withdrew. (R., p. 149.) The district court revoked probation
and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp. 151-52.) Clarke filed a motion under I.C.R. 35(b),
which the district court denied. (R., pp. 154-56.)
Clarke filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 158-59.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
“‘Once a probation violation has been proven, the decision of whether to revoke probation

is within the sound discretion of the court.’” State v. Le Veque, 164 Idaho 110, 113, 426 P.3d 461,
464 (2018) (quoting State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007)). Likewise, the
decision not to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Matthews, 124
Idaho 806, 815, 864 P.2d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 1993). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Clarke Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
Clarke argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and

executing the underlying sentence rather than retaining jurisdiction. “In determining whether to
revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation
and consistent with the protection of society.” State v. Del Critchfield, 167 Idaho 650, ___, 474
P.3d 1247, 1251 (Ct. App. 2020). “If the sentencing court has sufficient information at the time
of sentencing to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under
the factors articulated in I.C. § 19-2521, refusal to retain jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse
of that discretion.” Matthews, 124 Idaho at 815, 864 P.2d at 653. Clarke’s two-time failure on
supervised release followed by a year-long period of absconding demonstrated he was not a good
candidate for probation and the goals of probation were not being met.
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After reviewing the factual history discussed above (Tr., p. 12, L. 19 – p. 16, L. 6), the
court acknowledged that the question before it was whether probation was accomplishing
rehabilitation and protection of society, and determined that it was “pretty straightforward” that it
was not (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 7-10). The court concluded that, even if Clarke was honest when he claimed
to have abstained from using drugs during the year that he absconded from supervision, he “didn’t
live up to” his responsibilities and failed to show that he “could be rehabilitated by doing the
programming.” (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 11-17.) Noting its discretion, the district court revoked probation,
imposed the underlying sentence, and declined to commute or modify it. (Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17,
L. 19.) The district court’s determination that probation was not fulfilling its twin function of
protecting society while rehabilitating Clarke shows that the district court properly exercised its
discretion.
Clarke argues the district abused its discretion because of the possibility that if the court
had given him another opportunity on a rider, he might also have had another opportunity at drug
court, and might have been successful this time. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) He also argues that an
abuse of discretion is shown by his claim that, during the year he absconded from supervision and
was wanted on the bench warrant, he maintained a job, got married, and did not use narcotics. (Id.)
Finally, he claims an abuse of discretion is shown by the fact that he is “scared for his safety” if
he is “stuck in a cell with someone else for 20 hours” because he has “been diagnosed with Crohn’s
disease,” will frequently “need[] to use the restroom,” and inmates are “very unforgiving.” (Id.;
Tr., p. 12, Ls. 13-18.)
Clarke twice violated the terms of his supervised release, within three months the first time,
and three weeks the second. The second time, he absconded for more than a year. The hypothetical
possibility that he might have been successful if given a third opportunity hardly shows an abuse
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of discretion. In addition, Clarke’s bare assertion that he avoided additional criminal conduct and
drug use while a fugitive―though he could not do so during the brief periods he was
supervised―does not show an abuse of discretion.

In the first place, having absconded

supervision, the court had no way to confirm Clarke’s claim that he had not continued to abuse
narcotics and abstained from further criminal conduct. But, in the second, the mere fact that he
absconded from supervision for more than a year undermines any suggestion that he is
rehabilitated and society requires no protection. The act of absconding clearly demonstrates that
Clarke was not amenable to supervision and an inappropriate candidate for continuing on
probation. Finally, the district court considered Clarke’s health condition and related concerns
regarding his safety and determined it cannot “override the other sentencing factors here.” (Tr., p.
17, Ls. 21-23.) That Clarke feared a potential cell-mate might be angered by the number of times
he used the restroom does not show an abuse of discretion.
The district court’s conclusion that probation was not protecting the community or
rehabilitating Clarke are supported by the record, as is its conclusion that he was not a suitable
candidate for probation. Clarke has shown no error in those findings. He has failed to show an
abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of April, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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